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During the past decade, cotton prices remained 
considerably below other agricultural prices (although 
they recovered toward the end of 2010). Yet, between 
2000–04 and 2005–09 world cotton production 
increased 13 percent. This paper conjectures that 
biotechnology-induced productivity improvements 
increased supplies by China and India, which, in addition 
to keeping cotton prices low, aided these countries 
to cap-ture market share from (and cause losses to) 
non-users of biotechnology. By contrast, with a single 
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exception, Africa has not adopted biotechnology and, 
not coincidentally, its cotton output declined by more 
than 20 percent between the first and second half of the 
past decade. The paper concludes that the development 
implications of biotechnology go beyond cotton and 
Africa. High energy prices have been an important 
driver of the recent commodity price boom. Therefore, 
investment and policy strategy responses to a cost-driven 
boom should be consistent with cost-saving alternatives. 
Biotechnology clearly meets this challenge. 
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Cotton, Biotechnology, and Economic Development 
Although agricultural commodity prices may diverge from each other for short 
periods of time, they are expected to converge over the longer term since they 
respond  to  the  same  fundamentals  and  exogenous  shocks.  Moreover,  when 
supply and demand conditions force prices to deviate, producers will shift land 
and other resources from lower- to higher-priced crops while  consumers  will 
shift from higher- to lower-priced products, thus balancing the market and in-
ducing price convergence. Yet, during the past decade, the cotton market defied 
that logic. Between 2000-04 and 2005-09, the real agricultural commodity price 
index increased by 38 percent while real cotton prices declined 4 percent (figure 
1). More surprisingly, world cotton production increased 13 percent. That is, de-
spite declining cotton prices and sharply increasing prices of competing crops, 
growers supplied more cotton. Why? 
The cotton market has been subjected to considerable domestic support 
which encouraged more production, thus exerting downward pressure on world 
prices. While the effect of subsidies has been a hotly debated subject, the litera-
ture review discussed in Appendix A reveals that such effect is in the order of 10 
percent; that is, cotton prices are 10 percent lower than what they would have 
been in the absence of domestic support. This is a relatively small impact which 
by no means accounts for the large deviations between cotton and other agricul-
tural prices—especially if one takes into account the fact that other commodity 
sectors have been subjected to policy distortions as well. 
For the most part, the gap between cotton and other agricultural prices is 
explained by the use of biotechnology. Indeed, econometric evidence presented 
in Appendix B shows that the historical strong co-movement between cotton and 
other agricultural prices began weakening during the early part of the past dec-
ade and such weakening is explained by the use of biotechnology, especially by 
China and India. In other words, biotechnology-induced productivity improve-
ments by China and India generated supply response which was large enough to 
keep cotton prices in check. 
Between the first and second half of the past decade, China and India in-
creased their combined cotton production by  47 percent (table 1). During  the 
same period, cotton production in the rest of the world declined 7 percent while 
it declined 22 percent in Africa—not coincidentally, Africa did not adopt biotech 
cotton varieties. In short, early (and heavy) users of biotech cotton increased their 
market share at the expense of—and causing welfare losses to—non-users of bio-
technology. 
This paper examines the deeper reasons behind the uneven adoption of — 3 — 
biotechnology in the cotton market. The next section places biotechnology in the 
context of the global cotton market and reaches the following conclusions. First, 
some countries have reached full conversion to biotech cotton while others have 
not introduced the necessary legal and regulatory framework. Second, when cot-
ton biotechnology is introduced, conversion takes place quickly. Third, the bene-
fits appear to be relatively large, especially in developing countries where be-
tween 15 and 20 percent yield increases and 50 percent reduction in insecticide 
use have been observed. Section 2 discusses the reasons surrounding the biotech 
controversy and notes that opposition to biotechnology not only has blocked its 
adoption in Africa and other low-income countries, but also may have slowed 
down  the  development  of  second  generation  technologies.  Section  3  explains 
how Africa missed the opportunity to embrace the technology. The last section 
concludes and discusses policy implications and lessons that go beyond cotton 
and Africa. 
1. Biotechnology and the cotton market 
As in most aspects of life, the rules of allocating non-free resources are dictated 
by market forces or battles. Crops, including cotton, are no exception. Humans 
grow cotton for clothing while insects use it for food. Cotton growers win the 
battle by spraying the cotton plant with toxins. When the insects attempt to eat 
the plant (and, hence, the toxin), they die before inflicting irreversible damage. 
Here is where biotechnology comes in handy. Instead of the grower spraying the 
cotton  plant,  the  toxin  is  inserted  in  the  plant  by  genetically  modifying  the 
seed—a process similar to human vaccination. 
Early  stages  of  biotechnology  made  use  of  a  family  of  soil  organisms 
called Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) that produced certain toxins. Research by several 
public and private institutions in the early 1980s focused on inserting the Bt gene 
into  tobacco  plants.  While  initial  results  had  limited  success,  a  major  break-
through was achieved in 1988 by Monsanto—a biotechnology company—and by 
1990 the first Bt cotton varieties were commercialized (see Tripp 2009 for an ex-
tensive discussion of the development of biotech cotton varieties). 
Biotech cotton was introduced commercially in 1996 in Australia, Mexico, 
and the United States. China followed suit a year later and so did Argentina and 
South Africa in 1998. As of 2009, 10 countries have used the technology, account-
ing for more than half of world cotton area and 55 percent of production, a figure 
that may be higher if one accounts for illegal use of biotech varieties—illegal bio-
tech is widespread in Pakistan as it was the case in India a few years ago. 
At  least  three  countries  have  adopted  fully  biotech  cotton  (Australia, 
South  Africa,  and  the  United  States).  Argentina,  China,  Colombia,  India,  and — 4 — 
Mexico are heavy users as well where biotechnology accounts for two-thirds of 
cotton area. Brazil, which introduced the technology in 2006, currently allocates 
20 percent of cotton area to biotech varieties. In Burkina Faso, almost one-third of 
its cotton area was under biotech varieties in the first year of its commercial re-
lease (table 2). At a global level, James (2009) reported that as of 2009, 29 coun-
tries had used biotechnology. Soybeans accounted more than half of global bio-
tech area (52 percent), followed by maize (31 percent), cotton (12 percent), and 
canola (5 percent). Several other commodities are also using biotech seeds but 
their share in total biotech area is very small. 
Because of high R&D expenditures, biotech seeds are more expensive than 
conventional ones. At the outset, if the costs of buying these seeds are lower than 
the savings realized due to fewer chemical applications, biotechnology will dis-
place  conventional  seed  technology.  Otherwise,  the  technology  will  be  aban-
doned. So far, it appears that the former is the case. 
While the costs of the biotechnology are straightforward in the sense that 
they only reflect the costs of purchasing seeds, the benefits are more complex to 
evaluate because they are affected by several factors that go beyond the reduc-
tion in the number of chemical applications. To see this consider the following, 
purely hypothetical, scenarios (table 3). Suppose that growing one hectare of cot-
ton requires 10 chemical applications at a cost of $50 each or a total of $500. As-
suming yield of one ton of lint per hectare priced at $1.50/kg, it would imply rev-
enue of $1,500 and a profit of $1,000. If the use of biotech seeds (at the cost of, 
say, $150 per hectare) reduces the number of chemical applications to 5, it in-
creases the grower’s profit to $1,100, associated with an incremental net gain of 
$100 (the difference between $1,100 and $1,000), which is the incentive to switch 
to biotechnology. Assume now another scenario whereby the use of insecticides 
is sub-optimal, with an effectiveness-equivalent of say, 5 applications per season, 
in turn achieving half the yield compared to the 10-application scenario, generat-
ing revenue of $750 per hectare, with a profit of $500.1 If biotech seeds are used, 
in which case the 5 applications per season become optimal, the profit increases 
to $1,100 (same as in the earlier scenario), generating an incremental net gain of 
$600 (the difference between $1,100 and $500). 
Thus, the adoption of biotechnology can be viewed as a move along the 
production possibilities frontier (scenario I) or a move to the production possibil-
ities frontier (scenario II) depending on whether optimal or sub -optimal use of 
                                                           
1 The notion of sub-optimality used here is much broader than fewer chemical applications. It 
could include other aspects such as use of low quality chemicals, not spraying the right time, the 
proper amount, or the required type. These are common problems in developing countries due to 
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chemical applications took place prior to its introduction. In some respects, these 
two scenarios can be mapped to developed and developing countries where the 
input intensity may roughly correspond to the numbers used in this hypothetical 
experiment. Thus, the difference in incremental profit under the two scenarios 
($100 versus $600), which reflects productivity increases, can be seen as the driv-
ing force behind China’s and India’s adoption of biotechnology and subsequent 
increase in cotton production. 
The pros and cons of biotech cotton (and biotechnology in general) have 
been discussed extensively in a broad context and in terms of specific costs and 
benefits, the latter mostly  from survey-based research. Despite early signs re-
garding the benefits of biotechnology, institutions were at first reluctant to en-
gage in the debate (or take an ‚official position‛), not only in terms of policy or 
financial assistance but also in terms of a general policy discussion. Such reluc-
tance reflected, most likely, the controversial nature of the subject. 
Perhaps, the first institutional study to discuss and explicitly acknowledge 
the broader benefits of biotechnology in developing countries was FAO’s 2004 
The State of Food and Agriculture report, which showed that on balance, biotech 
cotton growers were better off than growers of conventional seed varieties. Indi-
vidual authors followed suit. Baffes (2005) argued that in addition to subsidy 
elimination and domestic policy reforms, adoption of biotech varieties should 
have been a priority among policymakers in low-income cotton producing coun-
tries.  Falck-Zepeda,  Horna,  and  Smale  (2007)  and  Anderson,  Valenzuela,  and 
Jackson  (2008)  warned  that  the  downward  pressure  on  world  cotton  prices 
caused by the large-scale adoption of biotech cotton is likely to force other coun-
tries to adopt the technology in order to compete in the global market. 
Numerous survey-based country-specific papers have evaluated the costs 
and benefits of biotech cotton. An earlier review by Smale, Zambrano, and Cartel 
(2006) surveyed 47 peer-reviewed articles published between 1996 and mid-2006. 
While they concluded that the evidence is promising in the sense that biotech-
nology is beneficial to producers, they also noted that it was too early to reach 
definite conclusions, in part due to methodological limitations and in part be-
cause the longer term economic impact is often shaped by institutional and polit-
ical  considerations  the  effects  of  which  cannot  be  discerned  within  a  limited 
timeframe. 
Later reviews, however, reached more definite conclusions. Qaim (2009) 
summarized the evidence from 11 studies representing seven countries (table 4). 
The results show that, on average, introduction of biotech cotton varieties is con-
sistent with a 50 percent reduction in insecticide use, 19 percent increase in effec-
tive yield and 160 percent increase in gross margin (measured in $US/hectare). 
Although insecticide reduction varies little among the cases reviewed, there was — 6 — 
considerable variation in yield increase (from no change in Australia to 37 per-
cent increase in India). Large variation was reported in the gross margin as well 
(from a low of $US 23 per hectare in Argentina to a high of $US 470 per hectare 
in India). 
A more extensive review undertaken by Tripp (2009) covered six countries 
but was based on broader survey coverage (table 5). His results are remarkably 
similar to those of Qaim (2009). For example, the average reduction in insecticide 
costs is 41 percent, with relatively little variation among countries. The average 
change in yields is 15 percent, ranging from a 2 percent reduction in Australia to 
a 35 percent increase in South Africa. 
Gruère and Sengupta (2011) reviewed 51 estimates based on 23 studies 
that focused exclusively on India and found even larger benefits. They concluded 
that, on average, use of biotech cotton reduces the number of chemical applica-
tions and pesticide costs by 36 percent each, increases yields by 34 percent, raises 
net returns by 84 percent, while it increases the costs of production by 15 per-
cent.2 
Numerous other models have evaluated the welfare gains from biotech 
cotton varieties. Depending on assumptions  regarding adoption rates  and me-
thodology, global welfare gains range from a low of $1.5 to a high of $3.6 billion 
annually (see Bouët and Gruère 2011). Welfare gains in Africa vary from a low of 
$20 million annually (Bouët and Gruère 2011) to a high of $214 million (Ande r-
son, Valenzuela, and Jackson 2008). Again, such range depends on numerous fac-
tors including modeling framework, country composition, and more importan t-
ly, price assumptions. 
2. The biotechnology controversy 
Despite its benefits, biotechnology remains a highly controversial subject which 
becomes  evident  when  considering  how unevenly  countries responded. Some 
have fully embraced the technology while others have not even introduced the 
necessary legal and regulatory framework. From the perspective of high-income 
countries, the United States and Europe have taken different stances with the 
United States being the leader in both development and use of biotechnology 
and Europe taking a cautious approach. Other countries fall into one or the other 
camp with most African countries taking the precautionary approach. 
Graff, Hochman, and Zilberman (2009) argued that adoption of biotech-
nology has been affected by the alignment of rent seeking behavior that influ-
ences the policy-making process. They also note that because companies in the 
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United States have a relative advantage in biotech innovation while Europe has 
dominance in agricultural pest-control markets, biotechnology advanced in the 
United States while conventional seed technology (which requires higher use of 
pesticides) dominated Europe. Paarlberg (2008, p. 119) argued that initially, ‚Eu-
rope’s precautionary principle had honorable origins‛ and reflected sensitivities 
related to environmental problems that took place during the 1970s and 1980s.3 
However, the public opinion in Europe shifted  against biotechnology—more so 
than North America—in part because of pressure by the NGO community (see 
below). Paarlberg (2008) also noted that, instead of using existing laws and regu-
lations, Europe created a new and very demanding regulatory regime, thus erect-
ing obstacles rather than creating opportunities for development and use of bio-
technology. 
At the time that governments were engaging in the debate of whether to 
adopt  and  how  to  regulate  biotechnology,  a  strong  anti-biotech  movement 
emerged in developed and developing countries alike. For example, following 
FAO’s publication of 2004 State of Food and Agriculture, a coalition of 670 NGOs 
and 816 individuals sent a letter (‚FAO Declares War on Farmers not on Hun-
ger‛) to FAO’s Director General expressing their disagreement with the findings 
of the report and their dissatisfaction because they were not consulted (GRAIN 
2004). Interestingly, a year later the American Agricultural Economics Association 
honored a key contributor of FAO’s publication with its 2005 Quality of Com-
munication award. 
A telling illustration is how opposition to biotech cotton has unfolded in 
India. Its logic is based on the following arguments. In order for growers to buy 
biotech  seeds  they  often  borrow  funds  from  financial  institutions.  If  the  crop 
fails, they will not have the money to pay back the funds and thus the financial 
institutions will not lend them again. Then, they turn to private moneylenders. If 
the crop fails again, the growers will not repay the private lenders, who, in turn, 
will exert a lot of pressure on the growers. Some growers cannot take such pres-
sure and commit suicide.4 
Various media outlets argued, often with graphic illustrations, that  bio-
technology has been the key cause of suicides in the cotton growing areas of I n-
dia. The issue was  picked up by western  media outlets as well. The New York 
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Times published the article ‚On India’s Farms, a Plague of Suicide‛ on September 
19, 2006 while the TV channel PBS aired the episode ‚The Dying Fields‛ on Au-
gust 28, 2008. On the more sensational side, reports have gone as far as naming 
India’s cotton growing region the ‚suicide belt‛ (a term borrowed from the ‚cot-
ton  belt‛  in  the  United  States).  Gruère,  Mehta-Bhatt,  and  Sengupta  (2008)  re-
viewed the Indian cotton biotechnology industry in detail and focused on the 
suicide issue. They concluded as follows (p. 38): ‚Therefore, it is not only inaccurate 
but simply wrong to blame the use of Bt cotton as the primary cause of farmer suicides in 
India. In fact, our overview of the evidence suggests that Bt cotton has been quite success-
ful in most states and years in India, contributing to an impressive leap in average cotton 
yields, as well as a decrease in pesticide use.‛ 
Herring (2008) argued that biotechnology has been subjected to framing 
by its opponents for at least two reasons. The first reason has to do with the pos-
sibility that biotech seeds may, in the future, incorporate ‚terminator technolo-
gy‛. In other words, plants from biotech seeds will not be able to reproduce thus 
raising fears that the entire food system would be dominated by multinational 
corporations which may manipulate the biotech seed market. Second, biotech-
nology has been stigmatized because the introduction of the insect-resistant trait 
into plants involved genetic engineering. 
The logic behind the first argument is, at best, weak and, at worse, flawed 
simply because the ‚terminator technology‛ concern can be applied to all aspects 
of modern agriculture (or any other sector of the economy for that matter). Most 
of today’s agricultural production depends on commercial inputs such as irriga-
tion equipment, fertilizers, chemicals, fuel, electricity, tractors, and trucks, which 
certainly do not have the ability to reproduce—in fact, most of these inputs have 
been instrumental for the success of the green revolution. If some (or, even one) 
of those inputs are not available, output from commercial agriculture will disap-
pear. While there may be imperfections in the way in which some of these mar-
kets function, there are plenty of companies willing and able to supply these in-
puts and no concerns have been expressed that the markets of, say, fertilizers or 
tractors have been subjected to manipulation. It is unclear why the biotechnology 
industry will act any differently compared to all other input-supply industries. 
But, even if the industry acted in a worrisome manner, regulation to ensure that 
anticompetitive behavior does not take place or funding of public research insti-
tutions to supplement private research would prevent likely problems. 
Yet, the framing has been successful, in large part because of the way in 
which biotechnology was marketed. Biotechnology was commercialized in the 
mid-1990s as a genetically-engineered technology with the stated objective of in-
creasing yields and generating higher profits for farmers in developed countries. 
However, at that time consumers were becoming more sensitive to food health — 9 — 
and environmental considerations, they were shifting to organic products, and 
they were becoming aware of the negative impact of OECD agricultural subsi-
dies on producers of low-income countries—the latter became apparent during 
the failed attempt to launch what would have been the Seattle-round of trade ne-
gotiations in December 1999. In short, a ‚transgenic‛, ‚genetically modified‛, or 
‚genetically engineered‛ product was promoted at a time when consumers were 
already  tuned  to  ‚organic‛,  ‚fair  trade‛  and  ‚environmentally  sustainable‛ 
products.5 Indeed, in 2004, the author met with  two senior managers of a seed 
company, one of whom strongly believed that the negative reaction against bi o-
technology reflected, for the most part, its name.  He argued: ‚Unfortunately, the 
name [transgenic crops] was left up to the engineers. In retrospect, it appears that cul-
tural anthropologists or sociologists could have assisted the industry with a much better 
choice of name.‛ He further noted that ‚biotech cotton‛ or ‚enhanced seed tech-
nology‛ would have been much better alternatives. 
3. The collateral damage 
Despite organized opposition, India’s use of biotech cotton increased every sin-
gle year since its introduction in 2002 and by 2009 had reached 80 percent adop-
tion rate. Biotech cotton was initially used in India on an illegal basis. And, ac-
cording to Herring (2007), it was the illegal use of biotech seeds that pushed the 
Indian government to put the legal and regulatory framework in place and even-
tually approve cotton biotechnology. In China, biotech cotton’s share reached 70 
percent in 2009. Between the first and second half of the past decade cotton pro-
duction in China increased 31 percent with similar contributions from yield in-
creases and area expansion (figure 2). India experienced a 51 percent output in-
crease during this period, with yield increases contributing almost three-quarters 
to that expansion. These yield increases are in line with the ones reported in the 
literature reviews. Today, these two countries dominate the global cotton market, 
accounting for half of world’s cotton output, up from one-third during the 1990s. 
Cotton production in Africa declined 22 percent (17 percent due to area 
contraction and 5 percent due to yield losses). It was only in 2008 that Burkina 
Faso introduced the technology and the second year almost 30 percent of its cot-
ton area was under biotech varieties. James (2009) estimated that biotech cotton 
in Burkina Faso is likely to generate economic benefits of about US$100 million 
per annum, based on yield increases and reductions in chemical applications ex-
perienced elsewhere. Again, these gains are very much in line with the benefits 
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reported  in  the  literature  discussed  earlier.  Anderson  and  Valenzuela  (2007) 
showed that the benefits from full adoption of biotech cotton varieties by African 
cotton-producing countries could be even greater than the benefits of the remov-
al of all cotton subsidies by the United States and the European Union. 
In view of these gains, a simple (and relevant) question is what if Africa 
had matched India’s and China’s cotton expansion record during the past dec-
ade? Africa’s output would have been 2.1 million tons instead of 1.1 million tons. 
Even at the past decade’s low prices of $US 1.30/kg, that would have generated 
an additional $US 1.3 billion in export revenues per year. Moreover, if the rea-
lignment of cotton prices with other agricultural commodities that began during 
the second half of 2010 persists, the additional revenue could top $US 2.0 billion.6 
While such gains would have required other policies and investments to have 
taken place as well, they are so large that officials and policy makers in charge of 
agricultural policies and investment strategies should take notice. 
Yet, concerns regarding biotechnology have been expressed at high levels 
of policy making in many African countries. For example, Uganda’s Cotton De-
velopment Organization—the regulatory body of the cotton industry—chose to 
proceed cautiously by examining the pros and cons of this technology despite 
Cotton Research Institute’s repeatedly emphasis on the need to venture into the 
area of biotechnology (Baffes 2009). Similarly, Zambia’s cotton development trust 
attempted to set up the institutional structure and eventually introduce biotech 
cotton but the President of the country halted its activities, in response to pres-
sure by various groups, including the Council of Churches. It was only in 2010 
that the subject of biotechnology re-emerged in the public policy making arena 
(Yagci and Aksoy 2011). 
Many authors have noted that Africa’s precaution with biotechnology re-
flects more external influence rather than domestic concerns. For example, Paarl-
berg (2008) argued that the views regarding biotechnology of some African coun-
tries and their subsequent actions have been influenced directly or indirectly by 
many European governments or their citizens through mechanisms which in-
clude financial and technical assistance, activities through international organiza-
tions, NGO activity campaigns, and import marketing arrangements. 
Regardless of the nature, origins, and degree of the opposition to biotech-
nology, commodity markets—and, perhaps, development—have been affected in 
at least two ways. First, because of the opposition, biotechnology adoption by 
developing countries was limited; ironically, that is where the technology turned 
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out to be most effective and is most needed. Second, the opposition may have 
slowed down the development of second-generation biotechnology since private 
companies are unwilling to invest in relevant R&D technologies because of un-
certainty  while  publicly-funded  (national  and  international)  institutions  limit 
their engagement in biotechnology-related research due to inadequate funding. 
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
During the second half of the past decade, commodity prices experienced the 
broadest and most sustained post-WWII boom. However, cotton prices remained 
stagnant—though they recovered towards the end of 2010. This paper conjec-
tured that cotton prices were kept in check in large part due to biotechnology-
induced expansion of supplies by China and India. Yet, Africa has a poor record 
not only in terms of biotech adoption but also in terms of having the necessary 
legal and regulatory framework in place. Only one African country—Burkina Fa-
so—had utilized biotechnology as of 2011. Not coincidentally, the region’s cotton 
industry has performed poorly. Between the first and second half of the past 
decade  Africa’s  cotton  output  declined  22  percent.  World  cotton  output  in-
creased 13 percent—India and China increased their production by 51 and 31 
percent, respectively. 
Against  this  background,  this  paper  highlighted  a  number  of  stylized 
facts. First, the use of the technology at a global level has increased on a conti-
nuous basis since it was first introduced 15 years ago—on average, each year an 
additional 4 percent of global cotton area is converted to biotech varieties, and, 
with a few exceptions, this has been the case at the country level as well. Such 
adoption rates imply that biotechnology is cost-saving to producers (since they 
adopt the technology), it is welfare improving to consumers (because they buy 
cotton at lower prices), it is profitable to the seed companies (since they expand 
their business), and it is beneficial to the environment (because of less chemical 
applications). On a global basis, the use of biotech cotton varieties implies a 40-50 
percent reduction in chemical applications and 15-20 percent increase in yields 
with relatively larger benefits accruing to cotton growers of developing coun-
tries. Second, if historical trends continue, almost all cotton will come from bio-
tech  varieties  within  a  decade.  Third,  in  addition  to  the  legal  and  regulatory 
framework, the largest obstacle to introduce the technology appears to be politi-
cal will. When the technology is introduced it takes off quickly, including in low-
income countries such as Burkina Faso—the only African country to embrace the 
technology. 
Despite such adoption rates and cost/benefit record, biotech cotton is still 
surrounded  by  controversy.  The  most  ferocious  debate  takes  place  in  India — 12 — 
where numerous reports in the local (and international) press and other news 
outlets have argued repeatedly and continuously that biotech cotton is the key 
cause of suicides among cotton growers in the so-called ‚suicide belt‛, despite 
strong evidence to the contrary.  While such opposition did not prevent India 
from utilizing the technology, it has caused irreversible damage elsewhere, espe-
cially in Africa. 
Such outcomes not only expose a gap between developmental objectives 
and results on the ground but also give some valuable lessons. On the one hand, 
cotton growers in the United States and Europe received a considerable amount 
of domestic support and, in the former, access to biotechnology. On the other 
hand, emerging countries such as India and China gained access to biotechnolo-
gy (despite strong opposition in the former) and on some occasions support. At 
the other end of the spectrum, African cotton growers not only did not use bio-
technology or support but also were not given the opportunity to evaluate the 
technology (even worse, on some occasions they were taxed). All this has led to 
the following paradox: African countries such as Uganda and Zambia with per 
capita income of $US 1,000 not using biotechnology for a raw material destined 
for exports and high-income countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United 
States with per capita income of $US 40,000 using biotechnology for domestically 
consumed food commodities. 
The development implications of biotechnology extend beyond cotton. As 
noted earlier, commodity prices are experiencing one of the broadest and most 
sustained booms of the post-WWII period. Such increases, which were seen in-
itially as welcome developments, have alarmed government officials and policy 
makers alike. It is becoming increasingly apparent that although a host of factors 
fueled the boom, higher production costs due to increases in energy prices have 
played a key—and, perhaps, the most important—role (Baffes 2011b). 
High energy prices will present challenges  and, perhaps, transform the 
way in which agricultural commodities are produced, especially in view of envi-
ronmental  sensitivities.  Therefore,  investment  and  policy  strategies  to  a  cost-
driven boom should be consistent with cost-saving alternatives. Biotechnology 
clearly meets this challenge. Indeed, researchers (e.g., Thompson 2011) are in-
creasingly recognizing the role these technologies could play not only in alleviat-
ing temporary price pressures but also in shaping longer term price trends.   — 13 — 
Table 1: Cotton production 
  1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-09    1990-94  1995-99  2000-04  2005-09 
WORLD 
  Thousand tons    Share of World (%) 
China  4,483  4,311  5,314  7,269    24.4  22.3  24.9  29.9 
India  2,149  2,767  2,864  4,742    11.7  14.3  13.4  19.5 
US  3,649  3,708  4,123  3,844    19.9  19.2  19.4  15.8 
Pakistan  1,591  1,646  1,869  1,986      8.7    8.5    8.8    8.2 
Brazil     556     462  1,013  1,285      3.0    2.4    4.8    5.3 
Africa     904  1,316  1,422  1,142      4.9    6.8    6.7    4.7 
Uzbekistan  1,356  1,095     994  1,061      7.4    5.7    4.7    4.4 
Others  3,692  3,993  3,703  2,952    20.1  20.7  17.4  12.2 
WORLD  18,380  19,300  21,303  24,282    100  100  100  100 
AFRICA 
  Thousand tons    Share of Africa (%) 
Burkina Faso    65  102  178  210      7.2    7.8  12.5  18.4 
Mali  116  194  198  130    12.9  14.8  14.0  11.4 
Zimbabwe    55  109    93  105      6.0    8.3    6.5    9.2 
Nigeria    54    75    89    91      6.0    5.7    6.3    8.0 
Benin    82  144  148    90      9.1  11.0  10.4    7.9 
Tanzania    62    59    62    89      6.8    4.5    4.4    7.7 
Côte d'Ivoire  101  133  129    68    11.2  10.1    9.1    6.0 
Cameroon    51    78    99    63      5.7    6.0    6.9    5.5 
Others  317  421  426  298    35.1  31.9  29.9  26.1 
AFRICA  904  1,316  1,422  1,142    100  100  100  100 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline) 
Note: All figures in this table (and the paper) refer to cotton lint.  
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Table 2: Area under biotech cotton varieties (percent of area allocated to cotton) 
  United 
States 
Australia  Mexico  China 
South 
Africa 




1996/07  12.7    7.7    0.8  —  —  —  —  —  —  —    2.0 
1997/08  25.5  14.0    7.8    0.7  —  —  —  —  —  —    4.4 
1998/09  45.0  15.4  14.3    2.4  12.0    0.8  —  —  —  —    6.6 
1999/00  58.7  22.7  12.5  14.2  28.0    3.9  —  —  —  —  12.1 
2000/01  71.1  30.0  33.4  25.0  24.0    6.1  —  —  —  —  15.7 
2001/02  76.7  30.0  27.4  32.0  74.0    4.6  —  —  —  —  18.1 
2002/03  75.4  30.0  37.6  48.7  84.0    8.0    0.5  —  —  —  20.2 
2003/04  75.1  60.0  41.4  51.6  86.0  10.0    1.1    0.5  —  —  20.8 
2004/05  78.0  60.0  60.6  59.1  75.0  10.0    6.1  23.0  —  —  24.3 
2005/06  81.0  90.0  57.4  62.2  84.0  20.0  14.1  40.0  —  —  28.4 
2006/07  85.4  90.0  59.0  66.6  91.0  25.0  41.5  44.0    0.5  —  36.5 
2007/08  90.2  95.0  60.0  61.0  95.0  25.0  66.3  57.0  13.0  —  43.5 
2008/09  92.6  95.0  65.0  65.7  95.0  25.0  74.0  71.0  20.0    1.6  47.1 
2009/10  95.0  95.0  62.0  68.0  95.0  85.0  79.3  61.0  20.0  30.5  52.0 
Source: International Cotton Advisory Committee 
Notes: ‘—‘ indicates that no biotech cotton was used. — 15 — 
 
Table 3: A hypothetical experiment on the costs and benefits of biotech cotton 
  SCENARIO I 
Optimal use of chemicals 
SCENARIO II 
Sub-optimal use of chemicals 
  Conventional  Biotech  Conventional  Biotech 
Number of sprays/hectare  10  5  5  5 
Cost of chemicals, $50/spray  500  250  250  250 
Cost of biotech seeds, $  0  150  0  150 
Yield, kgs/hectare  1,000  1,000  500  1,000 
Revenue, $1.50/kg  1,500  1,500  750  1,500 
Profit, $  1,000  1,100  500  1,100 
Incremental profit, $  100 (=1,100 - 1,000)  600 (=1,100 – 500) 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
 
Table 4: The economic effects of biotech cotton 






Number of surveys 
Argentina  47  33  23  2 
Australia  48  0  66  1 
China  65  24  470  1 
India  41  37  135  2 
Mexico  77  9  295  1 
South Africa  33  22  91  2 
United States  36  10  58  2 
AVERAGE/SUM  50 [53]  19 [31]  163 [303]  11 
Source: Qaim (2009), p. 672, Table 1. 
Note: The average reported in the last row has been calculated by the author. Numbers in square 
brackets show the India/China average. 
 
 
Table 5: Changes in yield and insecticide costs from biotech cotton 
  Insecticide cost reduction (%)  Yield change (%)  Number of surveys 
Australia  51  -2  2 
China  65  25  3 
India  27  15  10 
Mexico  77  10  2 
South Africa  38  35  9 
United States  47  9  1 
AVERAGE/SUM  41 [46]  15 [20]  27 
Source: Tripp (2009), p. 74, Table 4.1. 
Note: The country averages reported in the last row have been calculated by the author. The orig-
inal  table  reports  results  from  individual  surveys.  Numbers  in  square  brackets  show  the  In-
dia/China average.    
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Figure 1 




Production growth decomposition into yield and area, 2000-04 to 2005-09 
 



























Source: Author’s calculations based on USDA data
Note: Growth decomposition has been calculated as: log(Q2005-09/Q2000-04) = log(A2005-09/A2000-04) + log(Y2005-09/Y2000-04), 
where Q, A, and Y denote production, area, and yield. 
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Appendix A 
The determinants of the gap between cotton 
and other agricultural prices 
In addition to the biotechnology-induced supply response by China and India, 
two  other  factors  have  contributed  to  the  gap  between  cotton  prices  and  the 
broader index of agricultural prices. They are domestic support (with a negative 
impact on cotton prices) and biofuels (with a positive impact on food commodi-
ties). Both are discussed in what follows. 
The cotton market has been subjected to considerable domestic support 
which encouraged more production, thus exerting downward pressure on world 
prices. Distortions due to subsidies are not limited to the cotton market. Most 
commodity  sectors  are  affected  by  import  tariffs  and  many  also  by  domestic 
supports, export subsidies and export taxes (Aksoy and Beghin 2005; Anderson 
2009). During the first half of the past decade, the United States (which accounts 
for one third of world exports) supported its cotton sector to the tune of $US 2 to 
4 billion annually. The European Union provided considerable support as well—
around $US 1 billion annually—though applied to much less cotton and hence 
lower impact on world prices. Numerous other countries subsidize their cotton 
sectors as well. However, they have received less attention either because their 
subsidies are small and indirect (e.g., India, Turkey, and some West and Central 
African countries) or because the accuracy of the statistics has been questioned 
(e.g., China). See ICAC (2010) for the latest update on cotton subsidies. 
The effect of subsidies on the world price of cotton has been a hotly de-
bated  subject  and  the  estimates  vary  widely.  After  reviewing  the  literature, 
Baffes (2005) concluded that a simple average over all models implied that world 
cotton prices would have been 10 percent higher without support. Sumner (2006) 
reached  a  remarkably  similar  conclusion.  Based  on  evidence  from  various 
sources, he found a 10 percent increase in the world price of cotton to be a rea-
sonable estimate if the cotton subsidy programs were removed under the cotton 
initiative and other farm production subsidies were also reduced substantially. 
Jales (2010) found that reforms consistent with the December 2008 DDA draft 
modalities  would  imply  world  cotton  prices  6  percent  higher  over  1998-2007 
(ranging between a high of 10 percent in 2001 and a low of 2 percent in 2007). Re-
forms by the United States consistent with full implementation of DSB’s recom-
mendations would have increased cotton prices by 3.5 percent (ranging between 
a high of 6.5 percent 2001 and a low of 1 percent in 2007). The Cotton Initiative 
goes  back  to  2002  when  four  African  cotton  producers  (Benin,  Burkina  Faso, 
Chad, and Mali, the so-called C-4) argued that cotton subsidies caused world  
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prices to decline and reduced their export revenue. In turn, the C-4 asked for fi-
nancial compensation by bringing their case to the WTO. At about the same time, 
Brazil brought a case against the United States on cotton subsidies (see Baffes 
2011b). 
The 2006-08 food price boom was partly aided by growth in demand for 
biofuel production—albeit, much less than originally thought. Although the di-
rect impact of biofuel demand is felt only by maize, sugarcane, and some edible 
oils, the indirect impact is felt by most agricultural crops, because of the strong 
substitutability both on the input side and on the output side—especially in ani-
mal feed and vegetable oils which are highly substitutable commodities. Because 
cotton is not a close substitute to any other commodity, there no substitutability 
on the output side. There is substitutability only on the input side as land allo-
cated to cotton can be used for other crops. But even there, it is quite limited, at 
least in the short term, because other inputs, primary processing facilities, pick-
ing machinery, and other equipement are cotton-specific. Thus, converting cotton 
land to other crops and vice-versa takes more time compared to converting land 
from, say, wheat to maize. Indeed, between 2000-04 and 2005-09 (two periods 
that can be viewed as without and with biofuel as well), global area allocated to 
cotton declined by less than one percent. For example, although cotton area in 
the United States declined by almost 20 percent during these two periods, global 
(non-US) cotton area increased by 3 percent. By contrast, maize area (both global-
ly and in the United States) increased more than 10 percent during this period. 
Lastly, it should be noted that because cotton competes with synthetic fi-
bers, which are by-products of crude oil, it is often argued that crude oil prices 
affect cotton prices above beyond the impact through production costs. Baffes 
(2007) estimated transmission elasticities from crude oil price to the prices of oth-
er commodities, including food and cotton. The average elasticity for food com-
modities was 0.18 while that for cotton was 0.14. Therefore, on that count, cotton 
does not respond any differently than food commodities. 
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Appendix B 
The divergence between cotton and other commodity prices 
Commodity price comovement has been discussed extensively in the literature. 
Pindyck and Rotemberg (1990) analyzed price movements of seven seemingly 
unrelated  commodities  (cocoa,  copper,  cotton,  crude  oil,  gold,  lumber,  and 
wheat) and concluded that these prices co-moved in excess of what the macroe-
conomic fundamentals could explain. Explanations given included incomplete 
model, endogeneity, rejection of normality assumption, and bubbles or market 
psychology. Subsequent research, however, challenged the excess co-movement 
hypothesis  on  data  and  methodological  grounds  (see  Ai,  Chatrath,  and  Song 
2006; Cashin, McDermott, and Scott 1999; Deb, Trivedi, and Varangis 1996; and 
LeyBourne,  Lloyd,  and  Reed  1994).  Although  historically  cotton  prices  have 
tracked other agricultural prices very closely, during the past decade, they di-
verged considerably from each other (figure 1). It is only during the second half 
of 2010 that the two indices began re-converging. 
To  evaluate  the  degree  of  such  divergence,  the  following  regression  is 
used (see also Baffes 2011a): 
log(PtC) = μ + β1log(PtAG) + β2log(MUVt) + β3t + εt.    [1] 
PtC and PtAG denote the price of cotton and the agricultural commodity price in-
dex in year t (both expressed in nominal dollar terms), MUVt denotes the defla-
tor, t is the time trend, and εt denotes the error term; μ, β1, β2, and β3 are parame-
ters to be estimated. The agricultural commodity price index consists of 24 com-
modities, including grains, edible oils, beverages, and raw materials. Cotton’s 
weight in that index is 2.9%. Details regarding composition of indices, weights, 
and price data can be found at World Bank (2011). 
The first two columns of table B1 show estimates for the 1960-2009 and 
1960-10 periods, respectively. The exclusion or inclusion of 2010 was motivated 
by the desire the capture the effect of the recovery in cotton prices that took place 
during the second half of 2010. The estimate of β1 is 0.61 (excluding 2010) and 
0.66 (including 2010) are highly significant with adjusted-R2s equal to 0.91 and 
ADF  statistics  of  -6.03  and  -6.21,  respectively  in  turn  implying  strong  co-
movement between cotton and other agricultural prices. 
To examine the divergence between agriculture and cotton prices, [1] was 
reformulated by introducing a dummy variable, D = 0, 1960-2001 and D = 1, 2002-
2010, applied to both µ and β1. The break is expected to capture the introduction 
of biotech cotton in China and India. Hence, [1] becomes:  
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log(PtC) = μ + D + β1log(PtAG) + β1D*log(PtAG) + β2log(MUVt) + β3t + εt.  [2] 
Results from [2] are reported in columns 3 and 4 of table B1. The econometric 
evidence shows that the long run relationship between the price of cotton and 
the other agricultural commodities was even stronger up to the early 2000s, but it 
weakened considerably during the past eight years. During 1960-2002 real agri-
cultural prices were 4 percent higher than real cotton prices (2000 = 100); during 
2003-10 the gap widened to almost 60 percent. Even in 2010, when cotton prices 
enjoyed a spectacular recovery, their annual average was 30 percent lower than 
the overall agricultural price index. The estimates show that the recent recovery 
of cotton prices induced some degree of convergence (β1D increased from -0.51 to 
-0.34 when the observation for 2010 is included). 
Lastly, [1] was re-estimated by adding biotech cotton area as a share of 
global cotton area, BtSHARE, as follows. 
log(PtC) = μ + β1log(PtAG) + γBtSHARE + β2log(MUVt) + β3t + εt.    [3] 
Results from [3] are reported in the last 2 columns of table B1. As in [1] and [2], 
the adjusted-R2s are very high and the ADF statistics confirm stationarity of the 
error term at 1% level of significance. The estimate of β1 is 0.85 and highly signifi-
cant, remarkably similar to the estimate of regression [2]. The parameter estimate 
of the biotechnology share, γ, was negative and highly significant in both regres-
sions, implying that biotechnology accounts for the post-2000 gap between cot-
ton  and  other  agricultural  prices.  Interestingly,  the  parameter  estimate  of  the 
time trend—used as a proxy of technical change differential between cotton and 
other agricultural commodity sectors—is  not significantly different from zero. 
This should not be surprising because the share of land allocated to biotechnolo-
gy is, indeed, the best proxy for technical change. 
To conclude, the econometric evidence shows that while for the 4 decades 
staring  in  1960  cotton  and  other  agricultural  prices  moved  in  a  synchronous 
manner, they began diverging in the early part of the past decade. Such diver-
gence is accounted for by the use of biotech cotton. The next section places bio-
technology in the context of the global cotton market. 
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Table B1: Comovement between cotton and agricultural commodity prices 
  ————— [1] —————  ————— [2] —————  ————— [3] ————— 
  1960-2009  1960-2010  1960-2009  1960-2010  1960-2009  1960-2010 
















   
















   





























2  0.91  0.91  0.93  0.92  0.93  0.92 
ADF  -6.03***  -6.21***  -7.17***  -7.00***  -7.01***  -6.78*** 
Source:  Author’s  estimates  based  on  World  Bank  (prices)  and  International  Cotton  Advisory 
Committee (cotton biotechnology area.) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of cotton price. The numbers in parentheses de-
note absolute t-values while asterisks denote parameter estimates significant at 10 percent (*), 5 
percent (**) and 1 percent (***) levels, respectively. ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey 
and Fuller 1979) statistic for unit root and corresponds to the MacKinnon one-sided p-value. The 
lag length of the ADF equations was determined by minimizing the Schwarz-loss function. The 
standard  errors  and  covariance  matrix  have  been  estimated  in  a  heteroskedasticity-consistent 
manner using White’s method. 